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As a result of analysis of a certain published criminal case, the authors of the article come to the 
conclusion that from the point of view of the current criminal law it is impossible to classify a crime 
foreseen by Part 4 Article 111 of the CC RF on the feature of its being performed by a group of 
persons.
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“Criminal Law” journal (2011, No. 3) 
once published an article by A. Shiryaev titled 
“Criminal Responsibility for the Crimes Foreseen 
by Part 4 Article 111 of the Criminal Code of the 
Russian Federation Committed by a Group of 
Persons”, in which the author analyses the theory 
of causal relation and guilt identification problems 
and researches the criminal responsibility of the 
crime participants in a certain precedent1. 
We would like to take part in the discussion 
concerning the following case and express our 
attitude to the problem studied in the article from 
the point of view of legal evaluation of the actions 
taken by the participants of the crime.
The fact pattern of the case is the following: 
B. and S., on the one part, entered into a conflict 
with M. and Sh. In the process, S. stroke several 
blows on the face, head and body of M. with 
his fists. B., acting in concert with S., having 
found a piece of board on the crime scene, hit 
the occipital region of M.’s head with it. M. fell 
down, and S. and B. started to beat him, striking 
their blows simultaneously. S. was kicking M. 
in the face, on the head and on the body, while 
B. was hitting M., who was lying on the ground, 
with the board on the head and body. The medical 
examination showed that the reason of the death 
was a closed craniocerebral injury with a heavy 
brain contusion, haemorrhage into the matter 
and ventricles of the brain. The direct cause of 
the trauma and M.’s death was the blows stricken 
with a hard blunt object. Such consequences are 
not typical for kicks or fist blows. According to 
the circumstances of the case, the only one who 
was hitting the victim with the board was B.
The preliminary investigation bodies stated 
that the actions of B. and S. can be qualified 
under Part 4 Article 111 of the Criminal Code of 
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the Russian Federation performed by a group of 
persons. However, the court altered the actions 
interpretation of the crime: the actions of S. 
against M. were qualified under Item “a” Part 2 
Article 116 of the CC RF, and the actions of B. 
were qualified under Part 4 Article 111 of the CC 
RF, so that the “group of persons” feature was 
excluded from the formulation.
In his article, A. Shiryaev disagrees with 
the legal evaluation of the actions of B. and S. 
that was preferred by the court and supposes that 
the actions of S. were correctly qualified by the 
interrogation officer as under Part 4 Article 111 
of the CC RF as joint participation in the present 
crime. He points out that the “performance by 
a group of persons” feature foreseen by Item 
“a” Part 3 Article 111 of the CC RF is totally 
analogous to the feature of gang murder foreseen 
by Item “g” Part 2 Article 105 of the CC RF. The 
author of the article considers this conclusion to 
be right because infliction of grave injuries and 
murder are both intentional violent crimes that 
have common objective reasons and the same 
conditions of criminal responsibility incurrence 
if performed by a group of persons.
As we see it, identifying the actions of S. and 
B. under Part 4 Article 111 of the CC RF with the 
qualifying feature of “performed by a group of 
persons” is too judgemental as it does not fully 
consider the peculiarities of the crime and the 
concept of complicity in a crime, formulated in 
Article 32 of the CC RF. 
In his article, A. Shiryaev sets a question, 
whether it is possible to claim that S. and B. were 
embraced in their intent that was to inflict grave 
injury to the victim’s health? The fact pattern of 
the case allows us to claim that after B. had hit M. 
in the occipital part of his head with a board and 
S., observing that, started to kick M. in the face, 
on the head and the body jointly with B., then 
on the stage of committing the objective part of 
the crime the implicit agreement to inflict grave 
injury of the victim’s health occurred, so that it 
can be identified as a crime committed by a group 
of persons without preliminary conspiracy (Part 
1 Article 35 of the CC RF)
The circumstances of the crime, considered 
as a whole (the instrument of crime, kicking 
the victim on the head, the number of stricken 
blows and the intensiveness of the actions of the 
accused) push us to the conclusion that continuing 
the joint bodily blows with B. after B. had hit the 
victim on the head with a board, S. could realise 
the injurious character of both his actions and 
the actions performed by B.; moreover, seeing 
the instrument used by B. and the localization 
of the joint blows on the head M., S. foresaw 
the imminence of the grave injury inflicted to 
the health of M., and, as the story of the case 
suggests, wished for it to happen out of hooligan 
motives. This way, S. and B. were embraced with 
the intent to inflict grave injury to M.’s health.
Along with that, it is worth noticing that 
legally the crime foreseen by Part 4 Article 111 of 
the CC RF, joint participation in which is being 
imputed upon S., is a crime committed with two 
forms of guilt.
According to the definition given in Article 
26 of the CC RF, if an intentional crime results in 
grave consequences, which under the law involve 
a stricter punishment but which were not included 
in the person’s intent, then criminal responsibility 
for such consequences shall ensue only in cases 
where the person has foreseen the possibility of 
their onset, but expected without valid reasons 
that they would be prevented, or in cases where 
the person has not foreseen, but could and should 
have foreseen the possibility of the onset of these 
consequences. By and large, such crime shall be 
deemed to be committed wilfully.
Out of the definition quoted above we can 
see that a crime committed with two forms of 
guilt legally implies that the grave consequences 
which under the law involve a stricter punishment 
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(in the present case, the death of the victim) were 
not included in the intent of any of the persons 
participating in the crime commission. For this 
reason, in the present case qualifying the actions 
of the guilty persons under Part 4 Article 111 of 
the CC RF would mean that the joint intent only 
included implying grave injury of the victim’s 
health, and the death of the victim was beyond 
their intent. Together with that, according to 
Article 32 of the CC RF, complicity in a crime 
is the joint participation of two or more persons 
in the commission of a deliberate crime. Firstly, 
the guilty persons must have the intent to commit 
the crime jointly; secondly, the crime itself must 
be deliberate.
Analysing every term included into the 
definition of “deliberate joint participation” and 
“deliberate crime”, let us study the opportunity 
to qualify the actions of B. and S. as joint 
participation in the crime foreseen by Part 4 
Article 111 of the CC RF.
To prove his point of view, A. Shiryaev 
points out that in this criminal situation the 
participatory nature of the actions performed 
by S. and B. provided the grave result, while 
the actions performed by each of them were 
the prerequisite for the result. However, it is 
necessary to note that the joint character of the 
actions must bear both objective and subjective 
character. The subjective side of the crime, 
speaking in the most general way, is the reflection 
(or the possibility of reflection) of the objective 
features of the committed offence in the subject’s 
conscience, and characterizes the attitude of the 
subject towards it2.
Article 32 of the CC RF explains how 
the persons guilty in committing a crime 
subjectively evaluate the criminal action 
performed in complicity with other persons. So, 
as it is stipulated by the law, the participants must 
evaluate the criminal action they perform together 
with other persons as deliberate. Studying the 
present provision of law, it is worth emphasizing 
that in the modern science there is an established 
opinion that criminal intent can only be direct3, 
which means that all the participants anticipate 
the criminal result and make effort to achieve it. 
However, the crime components foreseen by 
Part 4 Article 111 of the CC RF, on the contrary, 
imply manslaughter of the victim through 
negligence, which excludes the intention of the 
guilty to reach the criminal result. Negligence 
implies that the consequence was not desirable by 
the guilty, and the common effort was not aimed 
at it. For this reason, the death of the victim in 
this case is not the result of the deliberate joint 
criminal behaviour of two or more persons, 
which means that the first analysed feature of the 
crime complicity stated in Article 32 of the CC 
RF, “deliberate joint participation”, is absent in 
this case.
Some authors think that the emphasis on 
the deliberate character of the crime committed 
by the accomplices is not an obstacle to qualify 
the actions of the guilty under Part 4 Article 111 
of the CC RF as joint participation in the crime, 
because the exception mentioned in Article 27 of 
the CC RF points out that in general such crimes 
are considered to be committed deliberately. So, 
in the opinion of V. Komissarov and I. Dubrovin, 
as the law classifies such crimes as deliberate, the 
consequences must be imputed in the executors’ 
guilt, no matter which one of them committed it 
(especially if the actions of all the guilty are in 
causal relations with the consequences)4. 
R.A. Sorochkin holds on to a similar 
opinion: studying the rules of treating crimes 
with two forms of guilt, he notices that literal 
interpretation of the criminal law allows 
participation concerning negligent consequences 
of a deliberate crime. The occurrence of the 
negligent grave consequence cannot be taken as 
an excessive act of the executor. The provisions of 
Article 27 of the CC RF, being a special norm for 
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Article 36 of the CC RF, consider the negligence 
concerning a grave consequence as a part of the 
intent to commit a crime, recognizing a crime 
with two form of guilt as deliberate as a whole 
and are to be applied in case of contradiction with 
the provisions of Article 36 of the CC RF5. 
However, even though Article 27 of the CC 
RF underlines the deliberate character of such 
crimes, to our mind, this circumstance does not 
allow us to recognize the fact of participation in 
the crime foreseen by Part 4 Article 111 of the 
CC RF. As it is obvious from Part 1 Article 24 
of the CC RF that determines the forms of guilt, 
Russian criminal law recognizes only two such 
forms, which are intent and negligence. Taking 
this into account, it is impossible to agree with 
R.S. Sorochkin who supposes that the provisions 
of Article 27 of the CC RF consider negligence 
concerning the grave consequence as a part of the 
common intent to commit a crime, as both intent 
and negligence are independent forms of guilt, 
the intellectual and will content of which are 
fully described in Articles 25 and 26 of the CC 
RF. To our mind, it leaves no more opportunity 
for one form of guilt to be accepted as a part of 
the other. The exception formulated in Article 
27 of the CC RF that claims that the crimes 
committed with two forms of guilt are in general 
regarded as deliberate, is, to our mind, a fiction 
that the legislative body had to use to unite these 
crimes under one of the categories (Article 15 of 
the CC RF), where the form of guilt is one of the 
classification criteria depending on their character 
and danger for the society.
Different sources rightfully notice that the 
structure of Part 4 Article 111 of the CC RF unites 
two of the deeds with their substantive constituent 
elements: deliberate infliction of grave injury (the 
first consequence) and manslaughter (the second 
consequence)6. For this reason negligence does 
not lose its independent character and is not 
regarded as a part of intent as it was mistakenly 
suggested by R.A. Sorochkin. 
Therefore it is suggested that the issue of 
participating in the crime foreseen by Part 4 
Article 111 of the CC RF has to be solved in its 
application to every consequence included into 
Article 111 of the CC RF, which are deliberate 
infliction of grave injury on one hand and 
manslaughter on the other hand.
Considering that the grave consequence that 
according to the law (Article 27 of the CC RF) 
foresee stricter punishment and are not included 
into the intent of the guilty (in the present case, it 
is the death of the victim) and are committed by 
negligence, the classification of the actions under 
Part 4 Article 111 of the CC RF with the feature of 
its being committed by “a group of persons” will 
contradict to the second analysed provision of 
Article 32 of the CC RF that states that complicity 
is possible only for deliberate crimes.
Therefore, in the analysed example the 
actions of S. had to be qualified under Item “a” 
Part 3 Article 111 of the CC RF as deliberate 
infliction of grave injury committed by a group 
of persons, and the actions of B., under Part 
4 Article 111 of the CC RF without the feature 
“committed by a group of persons”.
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Возможна ли квалификация преступления,  
предусмотренного ч. 4 ст. 111 УК РФ,  
по признаку его совершения группой лиц?
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В результате анализа опубликованного конкретного уголовного дела авторы приходят к 
выводу о невозможности с точки зрения действующего уголовного закона, квалифицировать 
преступление, предусмотренное ч. 4 ст. 111 УК РФ, по признаку его совершения группой лиц.
Ключевые слова: группа лиц, преступление с двумя формами вины, соисполнительство, 
соучастие, умышленное причинение тяжкого вреда здоровью, повлекшее по неосторожности 
смерть потерпевшего. 
